Upcoming Events

Logic Colloquium

February 14, 2025, 4:10 PM

1015 Evans Hall

Gaia Belardinelli
Stanford University

Belief updates under limited attention

Standard logical models of belief updates, such as Dynamic Epistemic Logic (DEL), assume that agents receive information about every aspect of an occurring event. This assumption is too strong for resource-bounded agents such as humans, who often cannot attend to all available information. In this talk, we will discuss extensions of DEL that incorporate limited attention to occurring events. First, we will see a DEL model for propositional attention, based on two principles for rational belief updates under attentional constraints. This model can be applied to analyze intriguing phenomena such as inattentional blindness, where agents may fail to notice conspicuous events happening at fixation. As models for propositional attention grow exponentially in the number of agents and formulas revealed, we will introduce an edge-conditioned variant that is equally expressive but exponentially more succinct. Finally, we will discuss a generalization of edge-conditioned models that captures attention to arbitrary formulas, allowing agents to attend to complex information such as higher-order beliefs or other agents’ utterances. This latter generalization opens questions regarding the formal properties of attention as well as its relationship with the notion of general awareness.

Logic Colloquium

February 21, 2025, 4:10 PM

60 Evans Hall

Simon Huttegger
UC Irvine

Logic Colloquium

March 14, 2025, 4:10 PM

60 Evans Hall

Eddy Keming Chen
University of California, San Diego

Exchangeability and Algorithmic Randomness: A New Proof of the Principal Principle

We explore the role of algorithmic randomness and exchangeability in defining probabilistic laws and their implications for chance-credence principles like the Principal Principle. Building on our previous work on probabilistic constraint laws (arXiv:2303.01411), we develop a new approach to proving the Principal Principle. This proof avoids circularity by grounding it in algorithmic randomness, frequency constraints, and exchangeable priors. Our approach establishes a direct link between long-run frequencies and short-term credences, clarifying the epistemic foundations of chance, typicality, and probabilistic laws. (Joint work with Jeffrey A. Barrett.)

Logic Colloquium

April 04, 2025, 4:10 PM

60 Evans Hall

Ronnie Chen
University of Michigan

Logic Colloquium

April 11, 2025, 4:10 PM

60 Evans Hall

Francesca Zaffora Blando
CMU

Logic Colloquium

May 02, 2025, 4:10 PM

60 Evans Hall

Omer Ben-Neria
UCLA