

Philosophy of language: quantifying in

(Franklin/MacFarlane)

This exam focuses on philosophical debates about quantifying in to modal and intentional contexts.

1. Frege, “On Sense and Reference” (in Martinich)
2. Russell, “On Denoting” (in Martinich)
3. Whitehead and Russell, *Principia Mathematica*, excerpts (from Ostertag, ed., *Definite Descriptions: A Reader*)
4. Strawson, “On Referring” (in Martinich)
5. Quine, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes” (in Martinich)
6. Quine, “Reference and Modality” (in *From a Logical Point of View*)
7. Smullyan, “Modality and Description” (JSL 13, 1948, 31-7)
8. Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions” (in Martinich)
9. Kripke, “Speaker Reference and Semantic Reference” (in Ostertag, op. cit.)
10. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (lectures 1 and 2)
11. Kripke, “A Puzzle about Belief” (in Martinich)
12. Kaplan, “Quantifying In” (in Martinich)
13. Davidson, “On Saying That” (in Martinich)
14. Barwise and Perry, “Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations” (in Martinich)
15. Crimmins and Perry, “The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs” (Jo of Phil 86, 1989, 685-711)
16. Soames, “Substitutivity” (in J. Thomson, ed., *On Being and Saying: Essays for Richard Cartwright*, 99-132)
17. Neale, *Facing Facts*