Many normative alternatives to classical decision theory have arisen in recent (and not-so-recent) years in response to particular paradoxes and problems. These alternatives must be evaluated according to standards of rationality, which raises the question of what decision-theoretic rationality amounts to. This syllabus studies four problems and the corresponding alternatives: (1) non-sharp credences; (2) risk-aversion; and (3) acts that are evidence for outcomes but not causally efficacious. It contains readings on a brief introduction to classical decision theory, the paradoxes and alternatives, and whether these alternatives stand up to the canons of rationality.

I. Classical Decision Theory: History of decision theory; uses of decision theory; the norm of decision theory; the status of paradoxes and counterexamples.


II. Paradoxes and Alternatives: Non-sharp credences, risk-aversion, Newcomb’s problem.


III. Rationality and Consequentialism


